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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

APPOINTING SPECIAL MASTERS TO EVALUATE THE
SUGGESTIVENESS OF A CHILD-WITNESS INTERVIEW:
A SIMPLE SOLUTION TO A COMPLEX PROBLEM

I. INTRODUCTION
A child’s memory is different from an adult’s memory. It is more
malleable and more easily influenced by such innocuous acts as asking if
something occurred. Simply asking a child if an event occurred will increase
the chance that the child will later say that the event occurred, even if it did
not.1 While this may be a “cute” phenomenon among children in everyday
life, it is certainly not “cute” when the child is a witness to a serious crime or is
alleged to be a witness to a serious crime. An interviewer can implant a false
“memory” of an event into a child’s mind by simply asking about it.2
Often, for child sexual abuse cases, the child is not just a key witness, the
child is the only witness.3 However, this evidence can be tainted during the
investigative process by well-meaning but poorly trained interviewers.
Problems can arise when the interviewer uses suggestive techniques that cause
the child to truly believe events happened that did not actually happen. To
avoid such possibilities, many safeguards are currently in place, such as
rigorous training for child witness interviewers; however, problems can still
arise. Problems can stem from such obviously suggestive techniques as telling
the child that other children are reporting that an event occurred and rewarding
the child for also saying such event occurred,4 to methods as subtle as simply
asking if an event occurred. When such problems arise, some courts now have
sanctioned pretrial “taint hearings” to gauge the suggestiveness of these
1. DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CHILDREN: A
GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS 54 (1998) (citing D.A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Interviewing
Preschoolers: Effects of Non-suggestive Techniques, Parental Coaching, and Leading Questions
on Reports of Non-experienced Events, J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 60, 129–154 (June
1995)).
2. Id. (citing D.A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of Parental Suggestions, Interviewing
Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports, Presented at the NATO Advanced
Study Institute (June 1996)).
3. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382 (N.J. 1994) (citing United States v. Wade, 338
U.S. 218, 229 (1967)); DIANE E. PAPALIA & SALLY WENDKOS OLDS, A CHILD’S WORLD:
INFANCY THROUGH ADOLESCENCE 363 (7th ed. 1996).
4. Such techniques have been used and were used to convict a schoolteacher in New Jersey.
See infra pp. 515-18 and notes 137–65.
499
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interviews.5 The trial judge presides over these hearings and decides whether
the transcripts of the interview and the child’s testimony should be admitted
into evidence. This is, for obvious reasons, a very important decision. Often
the decision to prosecute such an offender is based on the admissibility of the
child’s testimony. Deciding whether or not an interview has been conducted
suggestively requires knowledge of psychology, statistics, experimental
methods, and child development that most trial judges do not possess. An
adjudicator trained in these technical fields should be appointed to decide these
issues. Such a trained adjudicator is referred to as a “special master.”
Deciding if an interview was so suggestive that the child’s memory is
irreparably distorted and the child should not be allowed to testify in court is a
difficult decision that will often turn on a multitude of subtle technical issues.
A special master, trained in these issues, is better equipped to decide, and
should decide, such an issue when so much hangs in the balance. The
possibility exists that an untrained judge might exclude a valid interview based
on the testimony from an expert for the defense or that an untrained judge
might admit into evidence an interview conducted suggestively.
Part II of this Comment consists of background information and a
historical overview of the problem of the suggestibility of children in the
investigative setting. Part III details the psychological research in the area of
suggestibility of children during interviews. Part III also sets forth real-world
examples of the effects of suggestive questioning of children. Part IV provides
an analysis of the various proposed solutions to the problem of suggestibility
of children, including the response of psychological scholars and courts. Part
V concludes that New Jersey’s solution of taint hearings should be conducted
by specially trained adjudicators. Part V also outlines the procedure that
should be followed for the appointment of such an adjudicator.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL REVIEW OF SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN
A.

Psychological Research: An Analogy to Witness Interviewing

Perhaps the greatest confound6 to any experiment involving people is the
situation in which the people realize the goal of the researcher and “play[]

5. People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); Michaels, 642 A.2d
at 1382.
6. Confounds, or “confounding variables,” are variables that are unintentionally
manipulated and produce some effect during an experiment along with the treatment. MARK
MITCHELL & JANINA JOLLEY, RESEARCH DESIGN EXPLAINED 220 (3d ed. 1996). For purposes
of this discussion, the “hypothesis-guessing” confounding variable is most applicable. Id. at 221.
When an experimental group has guessed what effect is “supposed” to occur, it creates an
impurity in the measurement of the variables. Id. Basically, the experiment begins to measure
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along.”7 A person who has realized the researcher’s goal will tend to answer
the researcher’s questions in a manner the person believes is desired by the
researcher.8 For this reason, most psychological studies are designed so that
the subject9 and even the researcher are unaware of the hypothesis.10 These
dangers are present when a police officer is interviewing a child regarding
criminal activity.11 However, it would be virtually impossible to eliminate the
researcher’s and child’s awareness of the reason for the encounter.12 Although
the situations involved during a criminal interview and a psychological
experiment are clearly not identical, the analogy is equally clear. As a child
picks up on an interviewer’s goals, ideas, or biases,13 the likelihood that the
child will try to answer “correctly,” by telling the interviewer what the child
believes the interviewer wants to hear, increases.14 Because of this threat that a
child interviewee will discover the reason for the encounter and try to please
the interviewer by answering as desired, there is considerable reason to attempt
to reduce another confound of the interview process: the suggestiveness of the
interview, particularly for a child interviewee.15

the effect from the treatment as well as how much the experimental group has figured out the
hypothesis.
7. Id. at 9, 57.
8. Id. This effect is generally well-accepted among psychological researchers as a threat to
the construct validity, the extent to which a study is actually manipulating and measuring what it
claims to be manipulating and measuring, of an experiment. Id. at 8–9. The threat is that when a
subject realizes the experimenter’s goal, the answers given will no longer measure the desired
information, but rather how much the subject has learned the hypothesis. See id. at 17–20. For
an extensive analysis of construct validity and psychological research in general see MITCHELL &
JOLLEY, supra note 6.
9. Id. at 180. This is referred to as a “blind study.” Id.
10. Id. at 73. This is usually achieved by commissioning another person, unaware of the
goal of the research, to gather the data. Id. If either the subject or the researcher is unaware of
the goal, it is a “single blind” study; if both are unaware of the goal it is “double blind.” Id. at
180. This effect of knowledge of an experiment’s goal is quite powerful; it is often the basis for
double-blind testing of new, experimental drugs, to be sure a patient’s improvement is due to the
drug and not his or her belief that the drug will work. Id. at 73.
11. See PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3, at 363.
12. While it may be true that a child would not realize, at first, why he or she is being
questioned, it is equally true that the interviewer would know why he is speaking to the child and
eventually, if the interview is to be productive at all, the child will realize why he or she is being
questioned.
13. The form of the interview questions is the most obvious way to introduce such bias,
however, it can stem from the interviewer’s tone of voice, facial expressions, or an overall
accusatory context of the interview. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INTERVIEWING CHILD WITNESSES
AND VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 2 (4th prtg. 2002) [hereinafter DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET].
14. See POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 67.
15. For an exhaustive discussion of the suggestibility and believability of trauma survivors
in general, as well as the effects of trauma on the human mind, see TRAUMA & MEMORY (Linda
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Young children are particularly susceptible to suggestive questions;
therefore, there can be danger implicit in an improperly conducted interview of
a child.16 Child abuse is a crime that must often rely almost exclusively on the
testimony of the child reporting it.17 This implicates a “major social policy”
concern.18 Adults who abuse children must be held responsible, but incorrect
testimony could subject innocent adults to extreme punishment.19 While the
actual number of false allegations20 is highly contentious, the implications are
clear: There is a very real possibility that innocent adults are being punished
for sexual abuse that never occurred and, because of the dilemma of suggestive
interviews of children, guilty adults are going unpunished when the only
evidence against them, a child’s statements, is not admitted at trial.21 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey stepped forward to address the former problem
directly and indirectly addressed the latter problem.22
B.

Courts Begin to Take into Consideration the Suggestibility of Children

M. Williams & Victoria L. Baynard eds., 1999). This paper focuses on the legal issues
surrounding the suggestibility of children interviewees, which tends to increase as the age of the
child decreases. See PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3, at 363 (citing Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie
Bruck, Child Witnesses: Translating Research into Policy, SOCIAL POL’Y REPORT, Fall 1993, at
7).
16. Martine B. Powell et al., The Effects of Repeated Experience on Children’s
Suggestibility, 35 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1462, 1462–77 (1999).
17. PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3, at 363. Child abuse is “a crime that by its nature is often
without corroboration” beyond the child’s testimony. Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck,
Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 403,
408 (1993) [hereinafter Historical Review].
18. PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3, at 363.
19. Id.
20. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 18. False allegations, explicit allegations of abuse that
are false, are believed to occur by most researchers. Id. at 17–19. The reasons for such beliefs
range from suggestive interview procedures, to a child’s desire to live with one parent in a
custody hearing, to bribes. Id. The numbers are equally varied; obviously no exact number will
ever be calculated. However, estimates range from 5% to 35% of all reported abuse cases. Id. at
17–18.
21. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382 (N.J. 1994). Kelly Michaels, a college
student who was working at a day care, is one possible example. She is either an innocent person
subjected to a trial for child abuse spanning two years and who served five years of a forty-seven
year sentence before a New Jersey Appellate Division Court reversed her conviction due to
“unreliable perceptions, or memory caused by improper investigative procedures,” State v.
Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 517 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), or she is a child abuser who was
set free forty-two years early because of the same “unreliable perceptions, or memory caused by
improper investigative procedures.” Id. Regardless of what the correct answer is, the case of
Kelly Michaels is clearly a tragedy.
22. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1382. More accurately, discerning the suggestive interviews also
makes it easier to discern the nonsuggestive interviews.
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In State v. Michaels, the court recognized that “[i]f a child’s recollection of
events has been molded by an interrogation, that influence undermines the
reliability of the child’s responses as an accurate recollection of actual
events.”23 The court held that when an interview is so tainted by the
interviewer, the transcripts (and other evidence) of such interviews may be
inadmissible at trial.24 Further, the court held that a tainted interview could
even cause the child’s in-court testimony to be excluded at trial.25 The
Michaels court, therefore, held “that to ensure defendant’s right to a fair trial a
pretrial taint hearing is essential to demonstrate the reliability of the . . .
evidence [obtained during an interview of a child].”26 While New Jersey’s
idea of taint hearings has not been widely accepted,27 courts often accept the
reasoning as valid,28 and at least one state, New York, has employed the use of
a Michaels taint hearing.29 The resistance to taint hearings is mostly based on
resistance to psychology experts as “soft scientists”30 and judges’ beliefs that
the credibility of witnesses is in the sole discretion of themselves and juries,
regardless of the subtle science involved in the suggestibility of children.31

23. Id. at 1377. For a detailed discussion of the facts of Michaels see infra pp. 516-19.
24. Id. at 1380 (ignoring, for the time being, any possible hearsay problems).
25. Id. at 1382.
26. Id. The form of this pretrial taint hearing involves two stages of burden-shifting, which
ultimately requires the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a child’s testimony is
reliable. See infra pp. 524-25 and notes 217–30.
27. Bourdon v. State, Nos. A-7689, A-7699, 2002 WL 31761482, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App.
Dec. 11, 2002) (holding that Alaska has never adopted Michaels and that the defendant in this
case had ample opportunity to present the evidence of suggestibility to the judge and jury at trial);
Commonwealth v. D.J.A, 800 A.2d 965, 974 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (rejecting a Michaels taint
hearing and expert testimony as to the credibility of child witnesses); State v. Olah, 767 N.E.2d
755,760 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that it is no error to deny a defendant a pretrial taint
hearing); In re Dependency of A.E.P., 956 P.2d 297, 304 (Wash. 1998) (holding that any attack
on the credibility of a child witness can be addressed by a court during the competency hearing;
therefore, no separate taint hearing is required); cf. Ardolino v. Warden, Maine State Prison, 223
F.Supp.2d 215, 238–39 (D. Me. 2002) (reviewing the history of Michaels and stating that it is
unlikely the reasoning would prevail in Maine).
28. English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 146 (Wyo. 1999) (agreeing with the logic of Michaels,
yet finding no place for a taint hearing in Wyoming law).
29. People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 177–78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that a
hearing should be held to determine if a child was subject to an unduly suggestive or coercive
interview and if the testimony is therefore unreliable); Julie A. Jablonski, Where has Michaels
Taken Us?: Assessing the Future of Taint Hearings, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 49, 57–
58 (1998) (noting that the trend of cases seems to be developing toward acceptance of taint
hearings).
30. See Emily L. Baggett, Note, The Standard Applied to the Admission of Soft Science
Experts in State Courts, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 149, 155 (2002).
31. English, 982 P.2d at 145 (“[O]nce the child’s competency is called into question by
either party, it is the duty of the court to make an independent examination of the child to
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While there has been some resistance to Michaels among legal scholars,32 the
idea of taint hearings seems reasonable to many authors33 and has been
heralded as a societal good by others.34
Regardless of the perceived propriety or impropriety of the Michaels
decision35 or its acceptance among legal scholars, the fact remains that at least
some jurisdictions are conducting taint hearings for children alleging abuse36
and acceptance of the principles in Michaels by more jurisdictions seems
imminent.37 This Comment does not debate the propriety of taint hearings but
rather will address the procedure that should be adopted for taint hearings in
jurisdictions that currently, or in the future will, employ them. With so much

determine competency.”); Bourdon, 2002 WL 31761482, at *2 (holding that a criminal defendant
can raise the issue of suggestiveness on motion at trial before or after the child’s testimony has
been admitted). The Bourdon court has clearly disregarded the effect such testimony would have
on jurors and the near impossibility of the jury disregarding such testimony even if told it was
suggestive and should be disregarded.
32. Lynne Henderson, Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
479, 543 (1997) (“We need desperately to overcome the efforts to let abuse go unaddressed by the
legal system, and resist the campaign to discount or submerge these criminal acts.”); Lisa
Manshel, The Child Witness and the Presumption of Authenticity After State v. Michaels, 26
SETON HALL L. REV. 685, 762–63 (1996) (arguing that Michaels permits a defendant to
overcome easily the presumption of a a child’s truthfulness and that children should be allowed to
testify regardless of the suggestibility of their interviews and the jury should decide their
credibility); John E.B. Myers, Taint hearings for Child Witnesses? A Step in the Wrong Direction,
46 BAYLOR L. REV. 873, 877 (1994) (“[T]he New Jersey court’s decision breaks new and
troubling ground.”).
33. Thomas D. Lyon, Applying Suggestibility Research to the Real World: The Case of
Repeated Questions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 126 (2002) (concluding that while the
research on children’s suggestibility has undoubtedly done good, that within the confines of the
adversarial system the research could do great harm and may be more likely to mislead than
educate); see also Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children:
Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33, 87 (2000) (reasoning that
children should be allowed to testify in all but the most extreme cases of suggestiveness).
34. Jablonski, supra note 29, at 58–63 (arguing that the trend is toward accepting the
Michaels decision and that jurisdictions that do not follow Michaels do so on weak reasoning,
contrary to precedent, and do not address the issue); Karol L. Ross, State v. Michaels: A New
Jersey Supreme Court Ruling with National Implications, 78 MICH. B. J. 32, 35 (1999) (arguing
that the Michaels decision is proper for a civilized society that claims to protect constitutional
rights for all parties).
35. Although the debate as to the propriety of Michaels is intense, once one accepts that
some jurisdictions conduct these taint hearings, one’s attention should turn to how these taint
hearings are conducted.
36. E.g., People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); State v. Michaels,
642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994).
37. Jablonski, supra note 29, at 57–58.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

APPOINTING SPECIAL MASTERS

505

at stake during taint hearings,38 a taint hearing is certainly an exceptional
circumstance for which the presiding judge should have a firm understanding
of the complex psychological issues at play during child-witness interviews.
However, the jurisdictions that allow taint hearings require the trial judge to
preside over the hearing.39 The issues involved here require special expertise
in the psychology of interviewing (or at least training in the social sciences,
experimental design, and statistics),40 which is simply outside the ken of most
judges.41 Therefore, when a trial court has deemed it necessary to conduct a
taint hearing, this hearing should be presided over by an impartial judge with
special training and special expertise in this technical and hotly contested area
of psychology.42 Such a technically trained adjudicator is often referred to as a
“special master.”43 This Comment will follow suit.
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
38. As discussed, supra, the stakes are clear: innocent adults punished as child sex offenders
or child sex offenders freed as innocent adults. One need only consider the case of Kelly
Michaels to be assured of the exceptional circumstances in play here. Historical Review, supra
note 17, at 403–04.
39. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 810–11; Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1384–85.
40. Although judges often state that judging the credibility is solely within their discretion or
the discretion of the jury, despite any suggestive interview techniques, the multitude of guides
published to aid in the interview of children, e.g., INTERVENING IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
(Kathleen Murray & David A. Gough eds. 1991); DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13;
POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, and the proliferation of research published in this field, see
generally, Historical Review, supra note 17, at 403; Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, would seem to
suggest that the suggestibility of children is not within the ken of the average judge or juror.
41. While the proportion of judges with degrees in psychology has not been compiled, the
statistics for incoming first year students at law school is indicative of the background of
attorneys, which is ultimately the pool from which judges are selected. Most statistics do not
even have a “psychology” category of its own and such majors are lumped into the “other”
category or the “sciences” category. See SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 2003–2004
CATALOG 2 (2003) (“other” undergraduate majors totaling 1.8%); PROFILE OF THE STUDENT
BODY, Boston College Law School, at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/admission/profile/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2004) (“science” undergraduate majors totaling 8%). The schools that have a
“psychology” undergraduate category are in the 5% range of law students with a psychology
undergraduate degree. CLASS PROFILE, Columbia Law School, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/
prosp_students/jd_prog/applic_inf/Class_Profile (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); ADMISSIONS
PROFILE, University of Cincinnati Law, at http://www.law.uc.edu/admissions/majors.html (last
visited Feb. 1, 2004). “[T]his research area is developing rapidly and is riddled with a host of
complex issues that necessitate a broad understanding of design, statistics, and theory not likely
possessed by someone outside the research community.” Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at page
19.
42. See Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19.
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 53; see also National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396
(2000); Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2000); Civil Rights Act or 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000); People v. Superior Court (Laff), 23 P.3d 563, 584 (Cal. 2001).
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There is an immense amount of research regarding the suggestibility of
child witnesses,44 and there is an equally immense amount of commentary
regarding this research.45 The research is “developing rapidly” and is “riddled
with a host of complex issues” that necessitate such a “broad understanding of
design, statistics, and theory not likely possessed by someone outside the
research community” that an exhaustive review would be impossible.46 The
context of greatest concern regards the issue of rates of false positives and false
negatives of abuse.47 “[A] false positive is the error that arises when abuse did
not occur but the system concludes that it did, and a false negative is the
corresponding error that arises when abuse did occur but the system concludes
that it did not.”48 These errors are of obvious concern to our legal system: A
false positive possibly subjects an innocent person to some of the harshest
penalties of our legal system,49 while a false negative frees a dangerous person
to possibly harm another child. There are obviously extremes on either side of
the false positive/false negative argument.50 However, it should be apparent
that both of these situations present a grave injustice. The question then
becomes to what extent our legal system is designed to prefer one type of false
report over another.
44. See, e.g., Powell et al., supra note 16; Yael Orbach & Michael Lamb, Enhancing
Children’s Narratives in Investigative Interviews, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1631 (2000);
Ann-Christin Cederborg et al., Investigative Interviews of Child Witnesses in Sweden, 24 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 1355 (2000); Michael E. Lamb & Kathleen J. Sternberg, Conducting
Investigative Interviews of Alleged Sexual Abuse Victims, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 813
(1998). See generally Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15; Historical Review, supra note 17.
45. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33; Henderson, supra note 32; Lyon, supra note 33.
46. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19.
47. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 71. While there are any number of applications of
this research to other interview contexts, this paper focuses on the issue of self-reported abuse
against children. Additionally, there are many ways in which a child could provide false
information, which are of little importance to the issue of false positive or false negative reports
of abuse, such as the reporting of untrue “peripheral details.” Orbach & Lamb, supra note 44, at
1634. Peripheral details are defined as “details about [an] incident [of abuse], which [are] not
allegation-specific or plot related,” such as the color of the defendant’s shirt. Id. Obviously, it is
possible to report such things falsely, but whether a defendant’s shirt was blue usually has little to
do with the defendant’s guilt.
48. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 71.
49. Id. at 75–76 (“A false conviction in a child sexual abuse case may have some
particularly nasty consequences, including destruction of a family and exposure of the defendant
to intense public opprobrium and even physical danger.” (citations omitted)). Additionally “a
child abuse finding against a parent or parents where no abuse has occurred is as harmful and
devastating to the subject child as is the failure to find child abuse where such has occurred.” Id.
at 75 n.216 (quoting In re Smith, 509 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986)).
50. Some seem to argue that any attempt to uncover false positives is an example of how
“the criminal law continues to disadvantage the relatively powerless and perpetuate the dominant
ideologies of the powerful.” Henderson, supra note 32, at 479.
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Section A discusses the meaning of the presumption of innocence of a
criminal defendant and the ramifications this suggests for a preference to
release a guilty party, rather than convict an innocent party.51 Section B
outlines some of the laboratory research on the suggestibility of children.52
Section C gives a detailed explanation of the real world examples of
suggestibility of children, including an expansive look at the facts of
Michaels.53
A.

The Presumption of Innocence

An initial issue must be discussed before first delving into the matter of the
values our legal system places on false positives or false negatives. The issue
is the “goal” of researchers in this field. While some have argued that the
research is “pro-child abuser” or “pro-defendant,”54 one should consider the
ramifications of such research and the values to be discussed in this section,
before concluding that the research is “pro-child abuser.” First, a large amount
of the research in this area is focused on the creation of a nonsuggestive
protocol for the interview of children.55 This “protocol research” is designed
to decrease both false positives and false negatives.56 Second, the “protocol
research” tries to reduce the risk that children’s testimony will not be believed
and that guilty abusers will then be set free.57 Research has shown that jurors

51. See infra, pp. 507.
52. See infra, pp. 509.
53. See infra, pp. 516.
54. Henderson, supra note 32.
55. E.g., Orbach & Lamb, supra note 44, at 1633. One such example is the work of Doctors
Yael Orbach and Michael Lamb at the National Institutes of Child Health and Human
Development (NICHD), in Bethesda, Maryland, and their “NICHD Investigative Protocol.” Id.
The NICHD Investigative Protocol was developed to promote nonsuggestive interviews of
children. Id.
56. Id. at 1631–33. Less suggestive questioning has been shown to increase both the detail
provided by children and the accuracy of this detail. Id. at 1631–32. Suggestive questions, and
even simple “yes/no” questions, tend to increase the likelihood of false information, probably
because children are more likely to guess at “yes/no” questions and to acquiesce to the
interviewer’s suggestive questions. Id. at 1632. Therefore, the use of nonsuggestive questions to
elicit more correct answers decreases the risk of false positives or false negatives, by getting at
the truth more accurately.
57. See id. at 1633. During a press conference held after a jury had acquitted a defendant of
sexual abuse, many jurors claimed that “they believed that some of the children had been abused,
but were unable to reach a guilty verdict because of the suggestive way the kids had been
interviewed.” Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 2. It seems clear that at least some jurors, then,
will find a child’s story insufficient to convict a defendant if the child’s story was elicited in a
suggestive manner. “[O]nly improvement in the average quality of investigative interviews are
[sic] likely to bring about improvement in our ability to protect children.” Lamb & Sternberg,
supra note 44, at 821.
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are more likely to believe a child’s statements if they are shown to be in
response to nonsuggestive questions.58 Therefore, the attacks made by
researchers on suggestive questions can be seen as a warning to prosecutors
about the dangers that inhere in relying on suggestive techniques to secure
convictions.59 Finally, when one realizes that the vast majority of researchers
in this field recognize the dangers of suggestive questions,60 that courts realize
this danger as well,61 and that suggestive interviews are generally viewed as
improper,62 one can recognize that there is a very real possibility that
suggestive interviews will cause an important part of a prosecutor’s evidence
to be excluded at trial. Research designed to reduce the suggestiveness of
child witness interviews can then be seen as an attempt to cause better
interviews to be conducted and therefore lead to the admission of better
evidence63 and more of a child’s own thoughts at trial.64 The research aids the
search for truth by promoting more accurate fact-finding.
Finally, one must consider that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard,
which applies in all criminal cases, reflects the view that our legal system fears
the risk of a false positive more than the risk of a false negative.65 The United
58. See Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 2. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, in a rather
complicated fashion discuss this issue in terms of a “likelihood ratio,” in which jurors inherently
examine the chance that a claim is true or false. Id. at 76–81. A basic premise can be extracted
that if an interview is suggestive, and the jurors become aware of this, the perceived likelihood
that an allegation is false will increase and with it increases the likelihood that a child will not be
believed. Id.
59. Id. at 85.
60. Id. at 45 (“Virtually all research in the scientific mainstream . . . pays at least some
attention to the dangers of both false positives and of false negatives.”); Cederborg et al., supra
note 44, at 1355 (noting that there is a strong consensus among experts that as much information
as possible should be elicited by nonsuggestive means).
61. E.g., State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377 (N.J. 1994); English v. State, 982 P.2d 139,
146 (Wyo. 1999).
62. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826 (1990).
63. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1360. Cederborg, Orbach, Sternberg, and Lamb note
that suggestive interviews are likely to be inadmissible in court and that they seek to decrease
suggestibility in interviews to gain more admissible testimony. Id.
64. Id. The use of suggestive questions is likely to contaminate an interview with the
interviewer’s ideas, whereas nonsuggestive questions elicit more of the child’s memory. Id. at
1359; DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2; Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 46.
For a more complete discussion of suggestive interviews see infra pp. 509-516.
65. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital
role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk
of conviction resting on factual error.”) (emphasis added). “The requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure [because] [t]he accused during a
criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance.” Id. The loss of liberty is of
obvious importance as well as the stigmatization inherent in a criminal conviction, which is
probably greater in a child abuse case than in any other. Id.; Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33.
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States Supreme Court in In re Winship66 stated “explicitly . . . that the Due
Process Clause protects [an] accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.”67 The Court found it critical that the “moral force” of
the law not be diluted by doubt of whether or not “innocent men are being
condemned.”68 United States Supreme Court precedent reiterates that this
standard reveals a policy determination that “it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”69 Without belaboring the point,
regardless of the propriety of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, this is
the standard of criminal trials in America, and this suggests a preference to free
a guilty person rather than convict an innocent person.
With this preference in mind, it seems that research concerning the
suggestibility of child witnesses serves at least two constitutional purposes:
helping to assure the “moral force”70 of our criminal justice system and helping
to assure a more pure testimonial standard for children used at trial to achieve
convictions for the guilty. While one may argue that this standard is “prodefendant,”71 this is the constitutional approach72 and any attack on the
research as “pro-child abuser” ignores the testimonial benefits to children that
stem from non-suggestive interviews.73 With this in mind, one should look at
what a suggestive interview consists of.
B.

Examination of the Research on the Suggestibility of Children

66. 397 U.S. at 364.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 74. Indeed,
Ceci & Friedman argue that the Court’s preference to free guilty persons rather than convict
innocent persons is clear. In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995), the Court favorably
quoted THOMAS STARKIE, EVIDENCE 756 (1824), in stating that the standard of “beyond a
reasonable doubt” reveals a determination that it is better that ninety-nine offenders should go
free than to convict one innocent man. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 74.
70. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
71. This is not the only example of such treatment of defendants in our legal system. For
example, consider briefly the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Doctrine, discussed in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). “[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court” or a federal court. Id. at
655. Under the Fourth Amendment, then, even if incriminating evidence is discovered by lawenforcement officers, that evidence is inadmissible against the defendant. While this may be
“pro-defendant,” that is the price paid for constitutional protections.
72. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363; Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 74.
73. Some commentators suggest that believability and admissibility of the child’s testimony
are two of the most obvious benefits lost. See, e.g., Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 2; Ceci &
Friedman, supra note 33, at 76–81; Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1360.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

510

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:499

The history and research about suggestibility of children during interviews
is immense.74 While an evaluation of the entire body of research on
suggestibility of children would be impossible, some general principles can be
derived quite easily. First, suggestive interviews increase the likelihood that
unreliable information will be obtained; the likelihood of this result increases
as the suggestiveness of the interview increases.75 What constitutes a
suggestive interview is a complex issue, involving many factors, including the
form of the interviewer’s questions,76 repetition of the interviewer’s
questions,77 the interviewer’s tone of voice and facial expressions,78 the
general accusatory context of the interview,79 questions that stereotype an
accused,80 and other factors.81 The rate at which children respond to
suggestive questions with false positives is not completely clear. However,
there is a “strong consensus” among researchers that questions should be
formed in the least suggestive way possible.82 The research of Gail Goodman,
purported to be the “scholar most favored by child advocates” for her position
that false positives rarely occur, has provided “strong evidence that children,
especially young children, are suggestible to a significant degree.”83
One group of researchers84 categorizes the form of suggestive questions on
a continuum of suggestiveness, placing questions in one of four general
categories.85 Invitations, the least suggestive, consist of utterances, questions,

74. See Historical Review, supra note 17.
75. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 66–69; Lyon, supra note 33, at 113. Some techniques
are believed to increase false information by more than fifty percent. Ceci & Friedman, supra
note 33, at 54.
76. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1360; Orbach & Lamb, supra note 44, at 1631–33;
DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2.
77. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 42; Lyon, supra note 33, at 108; POOLE & LAMB,
supra note 1, at 55–56.
78. DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2.
79. Id.; POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 67.
80. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 63–64 (specifically addressing the vilification of Kelly
Michaels by interviewers during the Michaels case).
81. Such factors include repeated interviews. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 55.
82. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1355–56.
83. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 46–47. Goodman’s studies have found that young
children incorrectly answer misleading questions as often as 40% of the time. Id. at 50. The rate
of incorrect answers is as high as 16% for six- to ten-year-olds and as high as 9% for eleven- to
fifteen-year-olds. Id. Even Goodman’s lowest rate was about 3%, which is still a substantial risk.
Id. at 52.
84. The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development in Bethesda, Maryland,
is one such organization. It is a government-funded research facility.
85. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1357. Ranging from least to most suggestive,
respectively, the categories are invitations, directive questions, option-posing questions, and
suggestive questions. Id.
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or statements that prompt free-recall of the child.86 Invitations do not limit the
child’s focus in any way and consist of statements such as: “Tell me everything
that happened.”87 Directive questions are slightly more suggestive than
invitations. These questions provide details about an event that the child has
already mentioned and ask for more information.88
Option-posing questions are next. These questions can be dangerous
because they provide a child with a limited number of options, or “yes/no”
answers, such as asking “Did he touch you?” or asking “Did he touch you on
your arm or leg?”89 Option-posing questions are possibly the most interesting
and difficult to understand of the suggestive questions. For example,
researchers have shown that children are likely to attempt to answer optionposing questions, regardless of their knowledge of the answer, because they
feel they are being “helpful” or “cooperative.”90 Experiments in which there
were no “correct” answers have shown that children will typically choose the
last option from the choices or, in response to “yes/no” questions, will simply
say “yes” if the answer is unknown, even if they are explicitly told that it is
alright to answer with “I do not know.”91 Additionally, even when the correct
answer is “no,” children are simply more likely to answer “yes/no” questions
with a “yes” response.92
Finally, questions that strongly communicate the answer expected, such as
starting an interview by saying “We know he touched you in a bad place, tell
us about it,” are defined as suggestive questions.93 Questions that insert
assumed information are also defined as suggestive, if the child has not
previously stated the information.94 Perhaps one of the most shocking
experiments in this area had more than fifty percent of the children producing

86. Id. Inviting the child to recall the information without inserting any bias is the key. Id.
87. Id. Obviously there is some focus to the questioning. The interviewer should attempt to
gain that focus non-suggestively, using the child’s guidance.
88. Id. Sometimes called “cued recall,” these questions can become suggestive if the
interviewer mistakenly asks about events the child has not mentioned. This suggestiveness
usually comes from the reality that the interviewer has spoken with others about the abuse and
knows some of the surrounding facts. Whether these facts are true or not, it is more reliable to get
them first from the child, during the interview. This leads to a less suggestive interview.
89. Id. A child will usually pick one of the limited options, even if it is not true. The child
likely thinks that the adult knows the answer and that one of the options is the answer.
90. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 53–54.
91. Id. The child, in trying to answer correctly, believes that “I don’t know” is certainly not
the “correct” answer. Id.
92. Id. at 54. This concept is probably outside the general knowledge of jurors.
93. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1357–58. These are the questions typically viewed as
“leading” in legal terms, such as: “He forced you to do that, didn’t he?” Id at 1357.
94. Id. Even if it is a confirmed fact, the mantra is: Get the child to say it with free recall
first. This helps the reliability, both actual and perceived, of the interview. Id.
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false narratives about events that never occurred.95 For example, children were
asked: “Think real hard, and tell me if this ever happened to you. Do you
remember going to the hospital with a mousetrap on your finger?”96 Children
that had never, in fact, had such an experience provided narratives “rich with
details” and, surprisingly, more than a quarter of the children later refused to
admit that the event never occurred.97 It is reasonably well-accepted that there
is a substantial chance of false positives when interviews are conducted with
suggestive questions, even if the “suggestive question” is simply to ask for a
“yes/no” answer. Additionally, researchers tend to agree that free-recall
questions should be used as much as possible before any option-posing
questions are used, to avoid contamination of the interview with possible
inaccuracies caused by “the form of the question.”98 However, research shows
that interviewers in real-world settings often begin an interview with a
suggestive question.99
The dangers of suggestive questions can be exacerbated by repeating
them.100 While repetition of questions is often allowed in the legal setting,101
repeating questions during interviews of children presents a couple of specific
dangers. First, a child will perceive that he or she has answered “wrong” and
he or she will try to answer “correctly” by giving a different answer.102
Second, a child is more susceptible to change his or her answer and acquiesce
to suggestive questions if they are repeated.103 An interviewer’s tone of voice
and expression can suggest the “correct” answer to children as well.104
Although somewhat intuitive, the general communication style an interviewer
takes can greatly affect the interview.105
The basic advice to interviewers is that “[t]wo communications styles are
inappropriate when interviewing children for forensic purposes: talking as if
they were adults, and talking as if they were children.”106 A skilled interviewer
should develop a linguistic style that is structured to make sense to children,
considering their development, social and cultural background, and many other
95. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 61. Narratives are stories that sound real. The child
sometimes creates “real-sounding” stories to accompany the false answers to these questions.
Such stories add an element of reality to the answer.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1355–56.
99. Id. at 1359.
100. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 42; POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 55–57.
101. Subject to the limits for harassment.
102. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 56; Lyon, supra note 33, at 108.
103. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 56.
104. DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2.
105. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 153.
106. Id.
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linguistic characteristics.107 Certainly such an extensive grasp of linguistic
communications is beyond the ken of most people, jurors and judges alike.
An accusatory context or stereotype of the suspected abuser can also lead
to false positives and increase a child’s susceptibility to suggestive
questions.108 An accusatory context involves interviewers characterizing the
behavior of a suspect as “bad” or telling a child that he or she is there to “help
the interviewer catch the bad people” and attempting to elicit more
information.109 This will typically cause a child to shade his or her narrative
towards more and more “bad” behavior of the suspect.110 A stereotype of the
defendant as a “bad person” can be particularly damaging. One shocking study
involved the stereotype of a visitor to a classroom as “clumsy.”111 Children
falsely reported “clumsiness” as much as seventy-two percent of the time in
response to suggestive questions when the interviewer had previously
implanted ideas that a visitor was “clumsy.”112 This can have a particularly
noticeable effect when stereotypes are implanted outside of the interview
context, such as by parents during a custody dispute; yet, in that context, it is
often hard to realize that the stereotypes have been implanted.113 Thus, it
seems that a suggestive interview can be an elusive concept.
As a general rule, younger children are more susceptible to suggestive
techniques.114 Although young children “are capable of preserving and
accurately reporting memories over time,”115 there are differences between
young children’s abilities to accurately recall events, mostly regarding their
ability to focus on specific events.116 However, the most important factor of
age is that, for all levels of suggestive interviews, the effects are more

107. Id. at 153–54. This topic is immense; it encompasses intricate ideas such as an
understanding of the typical adult-child conversation, language development of children,
principles of vocabulary and vocabulary development, word syntax, cultural values of body
language, and other things. Id. at 153–80. For an in-depth review of these topics see POOLE &
LAMB, supra note 1.
108. DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2–3; POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at
61–64. Sometimes called “interviewer environment” and “social pressure,” the context of an
interview should not be designed to clearly tell the child why he or she is being interviewed. Id.
109. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 62.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 63 (citing Leictman & Ceci study 1995).
112. Id. at 64. The highest percentage was seventy-two percent for the suggestive interviews;
however, the “clumsy” stereotype had an effect on all groups. Id.
113. Id. Stereotypes that the other parent is “bad” can easily be fostered, consciously or
subconsciously, in these situations, especially if the separation is less than cordial.
114. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 7; Orbach & Lamb, supra note 44, at 1632.
115. Dana D. Anderson, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2117, 2137 (1996).
116. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 35.
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profound for younger children.117 A confusing issue for this factor is that the
effect of suggestiveness is based on the general development of the child, not
specifically his or her age. Therefore, when considering the suggestiveness of
an interview, one should consider the development level of a child, a factor
that is not easily deducible by mere intuition.118 An analysis of the
suggestiveness, therefore, requires some understanding of the developmental
stages of children.119 In this context, age of a child will, typically, actually
refer to the child’s development, more than literally referring to the child’s
age.120 Research has shown younger children to be more susceptible to
suggestive questions,121 to be more likely to follow the patterns regarding
“yes/no” questions,122 and to be more susceptible to stereotypes of
defendants,123 as well as all the other factors discussed in this section.
Therefore, while “preschoolers should [not] be deemed incompetent to
testify . . . the circumstances surrounding their recollections should be
considered with [their development age] in mind.”124
Third, it appears that the number of interviews affects the accuracy of a
child’s answer to questions and also increases the risk that suggestive questions
will elicit unreliable answers.125 Repetitions of interviews stem from several
sources. Often several agencies are involved in the investigation, causing
fragmentation that leads to multiple interviews.126 There will likely be a need
to interview a child multiple times as new information becomes available.127
Further, informal “interviews” by parents or others who want to discuss the
events with their children function as “repeat interviews.”128 “The impact of

117. Anderson, supra note 115, at 2137; DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, at 2.
118. See generally Powell et al., supra note 16; PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3. Certainly
age is typically a good measurement of development of children generally. Powell et al., supra
note 16. However, it is equally certain that not all children develop at the same rate. PAPALIA &
OLDS, supra note 3.
119. See generally PAPALIA & OLDS, supra note 3, at 35. Developmental psychology is
probably outside the general knowledge of the average juror.
120. For example, research that refers to “younger children” or even that uses young age
groups refer, more accurately, to “less developed children.”
121. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 7. They will, therefore, be more likely to acquiesce to
the question. Id.
122. See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. They will therefore be more likely to
choose the last option or say “yes” if they do not know the answer (or even if they do know the
answer). POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 53–55.
123. Anderson, supra note 115, at 2137–38.
124. Id. at 2138.
125. Id. at 2144–46; POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 55–57.
126. Anderson, supra note 115, at 2144.
127. Id. at 2145.
128. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 55.
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repeat[ing] [questions] is not uniform.”129 The effects vary with the number of
interviews, the intervals between interviews, and the types of questions that are
repeated.130 As the number of interviews increases, there is simply a greater
risk that some “improper” questioning will occur, and there is a “greater
likelihood that a child’s memory . . . is distorted by . . . the interviewer.”131
Also, as the number of interviews increase, the chance that questions will be
repeated increases, and as questions are repeated a child is more likely to think
that previous answers were “wrong” or to acquiesce to an interviewer’s
suggestiveness.132
One rather intriguing study involved the effect of “yes/no” questions that
implanted an idea of an imagined event in the memory of children over
An actor, “Mr. Science,” performed science
repeated interviews.133
experiments for a group of young children.134 After the presentation, the
children were asked: “Did Mr. Science put something yucky in your
mouth?”135 The children were later interviewed a second time. At this second
interview the children were again asked if Mr. Science had put something
yucky in their mouth. For one study, twenty-six percent of the three-year-olds
and thirty-two percent of the four-year-olds falsely reported that Mr. Science
had, indeed, “put something yucky in [their] mouth[s],” and even went on to
describe this event, though the only source for a memory of this event was that
a previous interviewer had asked the child about “Mr. Science” and the
“yucky” thing.136 It is believed that this effect is caused by children’s inability
to distinguish between information that is “familiar because it was mentioned
129. Id.
130. Id.; Powell et al., supra note 16, at 1475.
131. Anderson, supra note 115, at 2144–45.
132. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 55–56; see also supra notes 96–101 and accompanying
text.
133. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 54 (citing D. A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of
Parental Suggestions, Interviewing Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports,
Presented at the NATO Advanced Study Institute (June 1996)).
134. Id. (citing D. A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of Parental Suggestions, Interviewing
Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports, Presented at the NATO Advanced
Study Institute (June 1996)).
135. Id. (citing D. A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of Parental Suggestions, Interviewing
Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports, Presented at the NATO Advanced
Study Institute (June 1996)). Of course he had not. Mr. Science merely came and performed
science experiments for the children. Id.
136. Id. (citing D. A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of Parental Suggestions, Interviewing
Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports, Presented at the NATO Advanced
Study Institute (June 1996)). This is an example of a “narrative.” The child falsely says “yes,”
then goes on to add credence to his or her claim by saying how it happened. Mr. Science never
“put something yucky” in the children’s mouths, yet the children went on so say how he did it,
what it tasted like, and even posited reasons for why he would do that, among other things.
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in a prior interview and information that [is] familiar because the event had
been experienced.”137
This effect can be made worse by long intervals between interviews.138
Misinformation that is implanted in this way is also exacerbated as time from
the event increases because memory of the event decays and blends with the
information implanted by the interviewer.139 “Even in the typical sexual abuse
case, it is not uncommon for the alleged child victim to be interviewed several
times by a variety of agencies;” therefore, it is key to consider the
suggestiveness of an interview in light of the number of interviews conducted
before the subject interview.140 Thus, it appears that a “suggestive interview”
must be viewed from the totality of three general factors: suggestiveness of the
interview generally, the child’s age, and the number of interviews, all of which
can be affected by many sources and can have an interrelated effect.
C. Real World Examples of Suggestibility and Interview Techniques
Lest one should think that such egregious transgressions and
misinformation could only occur in the laboratory setting, with researchers
attempting to confuse children, one should look to some real-world examples.
Researchers using the continuum of suggestive questions141 have used
transcripts of actual child sexual abuse interviews to show both the extent of
suggestive and option-posing questions used with an inherent lack of free
recall questions and the extent to which interviewers use such questions early
in the interview (often as the first question), even after being warned of the
dangers of such questions (false positives and that the legal system will
exclude the evidence).142 Typically, fifty-three percent of all questions in an
interview will be suggestive or option-posing, while only five percent will be
of the free recall variety.143 While these numbers may be astonishing, they are

137. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 54. (citing D. A. Poole & D.S. Lindsey, Effects of
Parental Suggestions, Interviewing Techniques, and Age on Young Children’s Event Reports,
Presented at the NATO Advanced Study Institute (June 1996)).
138. Powell et al., supra note 16, at 1474–75.
139. Id. at 1475. Referred to as “trace theory,” this refers to the “traces” of memory that exist
in one’s memory. See id at 1473, 1475. The theory suggests that false details are easier to
implant as time passes because the traces of memory are stronger when an event is more recent,
while the traces decay as time passes. Id at 1475. For an expansive discussion of “trace theory,”
as well as the effect of repeated experiences on suggestiveness, see id. at 1463.
140. Anderson, supra note 115, at 2145; see also POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 55 (noting
that often children are interviewed between twelve and thirty times during the course of an
investigation).
141. See supra notes 80–95 and accompanying text.
142. Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1355–56, 1359.
143. Id. at 1359 (listing statistics for typical United States interviewers).
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not as concrete of an example as the interviews conducted in the Michaels
case.
“The interrogations undertaken in the course of [the Michaels] case
utilized most, if not all, of the practices that are disfavored or condemned by
experts, law enforcement authorities and government agencies.”144 The spark
of the investigation was a rather ambiguous statement made by a child, while
having his temperature taken rectally, that that was “what [his] teacher does to
[him] at naptime at school.”145 Some argue that this could have been a
misinterpretation of an ambiguous statement as an allegation of abuse, in a
social climate that was ripe for such a misinterpretation.146 Regardless of
whether this first incident was a misinterpretation, the court in Michaels and
the researchers are in agreement that virtually none of the other children
volunteered any information about the alleged abuse.147 All of the children
were interviewed by investigators that had no training in the interviewing of
children.148 These investigators conducted repeated interviews of the children
using no free recall questions to elicit any abusive information.149
Investigators routinely became frustrated with the children.150 The children
were often “asked blatantly leading questions that furnished information the
children themselves had not mentioned.”151 Investigators combined this with
social peer pressure, often stating that “other children had told [them] that
Kelly [Michaels, the defendant,] had done bad things to children.”152
This created an exponential growth in the number of children making
allegations also enlarging the magnitude of the allegations.153 At first, more
children reported “temperature taking,” then being touched with a spoon, then

144. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1379 (N.J. 1994). For an interesting and in-depth
review of every facet of the Michaels case from the perspective of an attorney for Kelly Michaels,
see Robert Rosenthal, State of New Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels: An Overview, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 246 (1995).
145. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 19 (internal quotations omitted).
146. Id. For an intriguing discussion of the social environment of the 1980s and why it was
ripe for such misinterpretations, see id. at 21–31.
147. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1379; Historical Review, supra note 17, at 403–04; Rosenthal,
supra note 144, at 252 (“[N]one of the other children made any reports of abuse until after [the
police] began questioning them.”).
148. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1379.
149. Id. The “abusive” facts were elicited through other, more suggestive, questions. Id. at
1379–80.
150. Id. They often became angry, saying such things as “[t]ell me what happened . . . . I’ll
make you fall on your butt again.” Id. at 1387 (alterations in the original).
151. Id. at 1380. As previously discussed, this is the most suggestive question possible, and
with repeated interviews, it can be particularly harmful.
152. Id.
153. Rosenthal, supra note 144, at 251–52.
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a child imparted that a “nude pile-up game” was played.154 Quickly other
children agreed that such a game occurred and added that Kelly would play
“Jingle Bells” naked.155 Soon allegations began that Kelly would insert knives,
spoons, forks, and Lego building blocks into them.156 Next allegations of
peanut butter and jelly being smeared on children and licked off began,
followed by instances of children being forced to urinate and defecate on Kelly
while she would force them to eat feces.157 Each time a new allegation was
alleged by a child, other children would be specifically asked about the
activity, often being told that other children had told investigators about the
event. Slowly, each child would acquiesce and say that it had occurred.158
Perhaps the most shocking part of the allegations is that during the seven
months this abuse was alleged to have occurred, while knives were being
“inserted into [children’s] rectums, vaginas, and penises . . . [not a] single
injury was reported on a single child that indicated any of these alleged
acts.”159 Further, not a single parent reported smelling any odd smells of
peanut butter or feces on their children or any odd behavior associated with
abuse.160 No pediatricians seen during the seven months of alleged abuse
noticed any abusive signs.161 No one at the day care noticed any of these
strange activities, and FBI laboratory tests showed no signs of “human protein”
consistent with the “nude pile-up game” or the allegations of urination and
defecation.162 Despite all of these inconsistencies, parents were told that an
investigation was ongoing “regarding serious allegations” of abuse, told of
other children’s tales, and asked to be aware of signs of abuse on their
children.163
The last “straw” of the investigation, for the court, seemed to be the
obvious lack of impartiality by the police. One interviewer stated that it was
“his professional and ethical responsibility to alleviate whatever anxiety [the
children had] as a result of what happened to [the children].”164 Guided by
their zeal and personal beliefs that abuse occurred, the interviewers did not
challenge the outlandish tales of abuse and proceeded to vilify Kelly in the
154. Id. at 252.
155. Id. Each time a new “fact” was uncovered, the investigators would begin asking the
other children if it happened. Id. Usually, after some time, the children would say that it
happened and add to the tales. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1379–80; Rosenthal, supra note 144, at 251–52.
159. Rosenthal, supra note 144, at 252.
160. Id. at 253.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 253–54
163. Historical Review, supra note 17, at 404.
164. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1379 (N.J. 1994) (internal quotations omitted).
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interviews.165 Investigators repeatedly told the children that Kelly was “bad”
and had done “bad things”; not surprisingly the children eventually “took the
bait” and reported the “bad things” she had done.166 “In sum, the record
contains numerous instances of egregious violations of proper interview
protocols.”167 Despite these facts, Kelly was convicted on one hundred and
fifteen counts of various abuse and sentenced to forty-seven years of
imprisonment.168
Kelly was eventually released, due to these “egregious violations,” after
five years of imprisonment; however, it should be clear that something went
wrong in this case. Perhaps Kelly was a child abuser. If so, she should be
finishing her forty-seven-year term. More likely, she was an innocent day-care
teacher. If so, she should not have spent five years in jail, as well as all the
years of investigation and her trial.169 Some suggestions to address the
problems of the Michaels case should be examined.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE COMPLEX PROBLEM OF SUGGESTIVE
INTERVIEWS
Section A of Part IV explains some of the methods, proposed by
psychological scholars, to reduce the problem of suggestive interviews.
Section B analyzes the solution proposed by the New Jersey Supreme Court to
address the problem of suggestive interviews of children.
A.

Psychological Scholars Propose Methods to Improve Interviews

Most researchers note the reality that suggestive hearsay will not be
admissible at trial,170 and they are also concerned with possible false
positives.171 Therefore, many researchers pose possible solutions for how to
minimize the problems that occurred in the Michaels case. The major
suggestions consist of training, formulating a uniform investigative protocol,
and recording interviews. Most researchers realize that “only improvement in
the average quality of investigative interviews are [sic] likely to bring about
improvements in our ability to protect children.”172 To this end, numerous
165. Id. at 1379–80.
166. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1, at 64. One child acquiesced and agreed that Kelly had
done “bad things,” but when pressed further, stated she did not know what the “bad things” were
because “[Kelly] only did them to [another child].” Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1385.
167. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1380.
168. Id. at 1375.
169. The investigation began in early 1985, and Kelly was convicted on April 15, 1988.
Rosenthal, supra note 144, at 248–49, 262.
170. See, e.g., Cederborg et al., supra note 44, at 1360.
171. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 33, at 45.
172. Lamb & Sternberg, supra note 44, at 821.
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training guides have been developed to educate and aid interviewers.173
Greatly simplified, the advice is to: (a) use free recall questions as much as
possible and, if option-posing and suggestive questions are necessary, to use
them at the end of interviews so that the transcripts of earlier portions of the
interview might be admissible; (b) try option-posing questions before
suggestive questions; and (c) try to quickly revert to free recall questions if
option-posing or suggestive questions are necessary.174
However, despite training efforts, interviewers will often revert to
suggestive techniques of interviewing.175 To alleviate this, two suggestions are
often made. First is the creation of a universal investigative protocol to guide
interviews while interviewing children.176 The protocol would function as a
“cheat sheet” of questions to ask children and to help interviewers maintain a
free recall interview for as long as possible.177 Second, many have suggested
mandatory recording of interviews.178 Recording such interviews has many
benefits, including a fresh account from the child, the fact that the tape can be
shared among agencies, reducing the need for repeated interviews, and the
existence of an easy way to check the interview for suggestiveness.179
“Undoubtedly, the research on suggestibility has done a lot of good”180 with
regard to training; however, there has yet to be developed an ideal
“nonsuggestive interview,” and taking into consideration the many factors of
development, interviewer question form, timing and number of interviews, and
necessity, it is unlikely that one will ever develop. Therefore, the question
remains how courts should address the issue when a defendant claims that an
alleged child victim has been suggestively interviewed, to the point of creating
a false positive. The answer provided by the New Jersey Supreme Court was
to conduct a pretrial taint hearing.181
B.

New Jersey Supreme Court Proposes Monitoring Interviews with Taint
Hearings

The Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the issue of whether or not a
particular interview (or battery of interviews) of a child (or children) was

173. E.g., POOLE & LAMB, supra note 1; DEPT. OF JUSTICE PAMPHLET, supra note 13;
INTERVIEWING IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 40.
174. Lamb & Sternberg, supra note 44, at 820–21.
175. Orbach & Lamb, supra note 44, at 1631–33.
176. Id. at 1632–33.
177. Id. at 1633.
178. Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction: The
Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 927, 941 (1993).
179. Id. at 941–42.
180. Lyon, supra note 33, at 126.
181. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382–83 (N.J. 1994).
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suggestive in Michaels, holding that a pretrial taint hearing should be
conducted wherein the trial court can make a ruling on the suggestiveness of
the interview and thereby decide if the transcript of the interview (and other
evidence of the interview) should be excluded from trial and even if the child
should be excluded from testifying at trial.182 This Section first looks at the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning and then turns to the
procedure mandated for these taint hearings.
1.

The Reasoning of State v. Michaels

Kelly Michaels argued that “the interview techniques used by the state in
[her] case were so coercive or suggestive that they had a capacity to distort
substantially the children’s recollections of actual events and thus compromise
the reliability of the children’s statements and testimony based on their
recollections.”183 Kelly argued that the interviews were so poorly conducted
that the reliability of the statements made during the interviews, as well as any
future testimony of the child might give, was patently unreliable.184 The basic
premise is that the suggestive interviews made the transcripts unreliable and
any future testimony the children might give would be riddled with the same
“impurities” from the interviewers that exist in the transcripts.185 The court
began by noting that its precedent was clear: “children, as a class, are not to be
viewed as inherently suspect witnesses.”186 The court, however, recognized
the dangers inherent in improper interviews of children because “our common
experience tells us that children generate special concerns because of their
vulnerability, immaturity, and impressionability, and our laws have recognized
and attempted to accommodate those concerns, particularly in the area of child
sexual abuse.”187 From this concern, the court also stated that the impact of
improper interviewing has a greater effect on children.188 The Michaels court
avoided the issue of “whether children as a class are more or less susceptible to

182. Id.
183. Id. at 1377.
184. Id. at 1375. This phenomenon, often referred to as “false memory syndrome,” states that
once a researcher or interviewer has suggestively implanted the idea of an encounter in a subject’s
or patient’s mind, that person will believe that it occurred and speak of it as if it actually occurred
thereafter. DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY 250–52 (1996). For an exhaustive
series of essays on the fragile and not-so-fragile aspects of the human mind, see id.
185. As discussed, supra pp. 511-12, an interviewer’s suggestive language can become part of
the child’s memory. If the child’s in-court testimony is thought of as simply a repeated interview,
the danger is obvious: Just as the later interviews will contain the misinformation, the child’s
testimony in court will contain the same misinformation.
186. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1376; Rosenthal, supra note 144, at 269.
187. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1376.
188. Id. at 1378.
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suggestion than adults”189 by focusing on the interview techniques used by the
state in its investigation.
The court’s analysis began by favorably citing research that found that
coercive and suggestive interviews can shape a child’s responses and that “[i]f
a child’s recollection of events has been molded by an interrogation, that
influence undermines the reliability of the child’s responses as an accurate
recollection of actual events.”190 The court noted the factors that can weigh on
suggestiveness.191 The New Jersey Supreme Court is not alone in recognizing
that improper interrogations can have a negative effect on children’s
testimony; “[o]ther courts have recognized that once tainted the distortion of
[a] child’s mind is irremediable.”192 The court felt that the fact that the
research is virtually unanimous in its view of dangers of improper interview
techniques and that so much effort is put into training of interviewers and into
the productions of protocols for interviewing helped to bolster the conclusion
that improper techniques for interviewing lead to inadmissible testimony.193
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court looked to United States Supreme
Court precedent that is in accord with the belief that improper interrogations of
children lead to inadmissible testimony.194 The case of Idaho v. Wright,195
addressed the admissibility of a child’s hearsay in light of the suggestive
technique used to elicit this hearsay.196 Unlike Michaels, Wright dealt with the
exclusion of the hearsay testimony of the child only.197 The court found that
the hearsay statements of the child should be excluded under the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause doctrine.198 The Confrontation Clause,
189. Id. at 1376–77.
190. Id. at 1377.
191. Id. The court reviewed the research and noted that lack of interviewer neutrality, leading
questions, a lack of control over peer pressure, the use of repeated questions, the vilification of
the suspect, the interviewer’s tone of voice, and promised rewards, among other factors, could
undermine an interview. Id.
192. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377–78 (citing State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1228 (Idaho
1989) (“Once this tainting of memory has occurred, the problem is irredeemable. That memory
is, from then on, as real to the child as any other.”).
193. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1378.
194. Id.
195. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
196. Id. at 814–17.
197. Id. at 814–16. In this case all parties and the court agreed that the young hearsay
declarant was not capable of communicating with the jury. Id. at 809. For this reason, the Court
did not need to address the question of the child testifying in court after the suggestive interview
techniques had been used on the child.
198. Id. at 826–27. The defendant in Wright had challenged the witness’s testimony under
the Sixth Amendment preference for a “face-to-face” confrontation with the witness. Id. at 812–
14. The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when (1) the witness is shown to
be unavailable, a fact stipulated by both parties, id. at 809, and (2) the statement bears sufficient

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

APPOINTING SPECIAL MASTERS

523

basically, protects the right of a criminal defendant to confront and crossexamine those who testify against the defendant. Hearsay is implicated in the
Confrontation Clause because a criminal defendant does not have the chance to
confront the declarant of a hearsay statement in court.
The United States Supreme Court first found that “Idaho’s residual hearsay
exception . . . under which the challenged statements were admitted . . . is not a
firmly rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes[;]”
therefore, the statements would need to show “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness” to be admitted.199 The Court then went on to find that
because of the presumptive unreliability of out-of-court statements and the
suggestive questions used to generate the hearsay, there was no reason to find
the statements “particularly trustworthy.”200 The Court based this decision to
exclude, in part, on the suggestive interview techniques used by the
interviewer.201 The New Jersey Supreme Court found that United States
Supreme Court precedent was in accord that improper interrogations of the
type that occurred in Michaels indicate the “potential for the elicitation of
unreliable information.”202 The New Jersey Supreme Court summarized by
stating that a “sufficient consensus exists . . . to warrant the conclusion that the
use of coercive or highly suggestive interrogation techniques can create a
significant risk that the interrogation itself will distort the child’s recollection
of events, thereby undermining the reliability of the statements and subsequent
testimony concerning such events.”203
The Michaels Court then examined the facts of this particular case204 and
agreed with the appellate court that the interviews appeared “highly
improper.”205 The court then took the “somewhat extraordinary step”206 of
mandating that a pretrial taint hearing be conducted to determine if the
“pretrial statements and in-court testimony based on that recollection are
unreliable and should not be admitted into evidence” if the state sought to
prosecute its case against Kelly Michaels.207 However, to bolster the
credibility of this decision, the court drew analogies to existing pretrial
indicia of reliability. Id. at 814–15. This “[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception[;]” for other cases, a showing
of “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” is required. Id. at 815 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980)).
199. Id. at 815–17.
200. Wright, 497 U.S. at 826.
201. Id.
202. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1378 (N.J. 1994) (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 812–13).
203. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added).
204. See supra pp. 516-19.
205. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1380.
206. Id. at 1381.
207. Id. at 1380.
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eyewitness identification and hypnotically-recalled testimony.208 Courts have
authorized pretrial hearings on the admissibility of pretrial identification
testimony believed to be tainted by suggestiveness.209 A court, therefore,
should examine all of the circumstances when determining whether the
procedure used to obtain a pretrial identification was suggestive enough to
cause an irreparable mistaken identification.210 At such a hearing, “[i]f the
court finds the pre-trial identification procedure unduly suggestive, giving rise
to a substantial likelihood of misidentification, the testimony is inadmissible at
trial.”211
Hypnotically recalled testimony presents a suggestiveness problem similar
to child interviews and prior New Jersey precedent authorized a similar taint
hearing.212 A person under hypnosis is vulnerable to suggestion; therefore, a
court should conduct a hearing to gauge if unduly suggestive properties
inhered during a particular hypnotic episode before hypnotically enhanced
testimony can be admitted at trial.213 In both of these examples, the court saw
“extraordinary situations” where police misconduct possibly compromised the
judicial system and stated that the court would not back down from assuring
the integrity of the judicial system.214
The Michaels Court therefore found support for its decision to require a
taint hearing in United States Supreme Court precedent concerning pretrial
hearings on identification procedures.215 The situations involved are virtually
identical. Pretrial identifications and pretrial investigative interviews of child
sexual abuse victims are both “critical moment[s] in the course of a criminal

208. Id. at 1381; Jablonski, supra note 29, at 53–55. Hypnotically recalled testimony
involves the use of hypnosis, usually performed by a trained psychologist, to enhance a person’s
recollection. See id. at 52–55. The entire procedure is often referred to as a “hypnotic episode”
and can make the “individual under hypnosis . . . extremely vulnerable to suggestion, lose[]
critical judgment, [or possibly] confuse memories evoked under hypnosis with those recalled
prior to the hypnotic state.” Id. at 55. Many states have substantial legislative and judicial
safeguards in place to govern the admissibility of such hypnotically induced testimony. Andrew
J. Hickey, Evidence—Rhode Island Courts Require Preliminary Hearing When Determining
Admissibility of Expert Proffered Repressed Memory Testimony State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d
879 (R.I. 1996), 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 771, 772–74 (1996).
209. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1381 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977)
(authorizing hearing to determine admissibility of in court identification testimony because of
pretrial suggestiveness)).
210. Jablonski, supra note 29, at 54 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967)).
211. Id.
212. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1381 (citing State v. Sugar, 417 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1980)); see also
Jablonski, supra note 29, at 54–55 (citing State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 97–98 (N.J. 1981)).
213. Jablonski, supra note 29, at 55.
214. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1381.
215. Id. at 1382 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)).
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prosecution.”216 In both instances, a case can be dismissed if damaging
information regarding a suspect is not acquired; however, both are “riddled
with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even
crucially, derogate from a fair trial.”217 Additionally, both types of testimony
are virtually impossible to overcome, particularly because in both situations the
witness is “absolutely convinced of the accuracy of [his or her false]
recollection.”218 Because of this conviction, the credibility219 of the witness
will be virtually impeccable, despite the falsehood of the person’s statements.
Credibility, in this context, is the witness’s “truth-telling demeanor,” typically
decided by a jury.220 After determining that a taint hearing would be in order,
the Michaels Court turned to the mechanics of such a hearing.
2.

Procedure for Taint Hearings Outlined by State v. Michaels

The basic issue to be decided at the taint hearing is “whether the pretrial
events . . . were so suggestive that they give rise to a substantial likelihood of
irreparably mistaken or false recollection of material facts bearing on the
defendant’s guilt.”221 The court addressed the issue of whether the interview
technique was so improper as to distort the children’s recollections and
compromise the out-of-court and in-court statements of the children by
adopting a two-step, burden-shifting structure.222 The initial burden is on the
defendant to produce “some evidence” that the child’s statements were the
product of improper interviewing223 to trigger a pretrial hearing.224 The court
noted, without limiting the grounds that may trigger a taint hearing, that:
[T]he kind of practices used here—the absence of spontaneous recall,
interviewer bias, repeated leading questions, multiple interviews, incessant
questioning, vilification of defendant, ongoing contact with peers and
references to their statements, and the use of threats, bribes and cajoling, as
well as the failure to videotape or otherwise document the initial interview
sessions—constitute more than sufficient evidence to support a finding that the

216. Id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967)).
217. Id. (quoting Wade, 388 U.S at 230). The parallels between a pretrial identification,
where a victim or witness actually points a finger at the suspect and a child sexual abuse
interview, where the child points out the abuser, are obvious.
218. Id. Eyewitness identifications and a child saying that the suspect abused him or her are
powerful types of evidence. This power is generally made more convincing if the witness or
child is convinced that the identification is correct and believes it.
219. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1382.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1382–83.
222. Id. at 1377–85.
223. Id. at 1383. This keeps with the idea that children are presumed to be no less reliable
than other witnesses. Id.
224. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383.
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interrogations created a substantial risk that the statements and anticipated
testimony are unreliable, and therefore justify a taint hearing.225

The burden would then shift to the proponent of the evidence to prove the
reliability of the testimony by “clear and convincing evidence.”226
The court then went on to state that both the state and the defendant are
permitted to offer expert testimony regarding the practices used in the
interviews.227 The court further cautioned that the testimony should be limited
to an attack on (or the support of) the interview techniques, not the credibility
of the child.228 Further, the court held that the state can demonstrate that the
child’s statements are reliable by offering independent indicia of reliability that
supports the child’s statements.229 This element keeps the focus on the totality
of the circumstances, which must be examined to decide whether events have
“irremediably distorted” the child’s testimony and memory.230 Finally, the
court held that if any portions of a child’s testimony are found by the judge to
be sufficiently reliable for admission at trial, then it is for the jury to decide the
probative value of the evidence, and, to that end, experts may again be called
to testify as to the methods of interviewing used in the investigation.231 New
York, which has adopted the Michaels taint hearing, also follows these same
procedures for conducting the hearings.232
While there has not been a rush to adopt the procedure of taint hearings
advocated in Michaels, at least one state has adopted this process, and it has
been suggested that a trend will develop in that direction.233 Therefore,
although there are certainly jurisdictions that do not employ taint hearings,234
the question for the jurisdictions that currently employ them becomes how

225. Id. Virtually all of the sorts of techniques which were discussed in this Comment as
being too suggestive.
226. Id. This standard was chosen to serve “to safeguard the fairness of a defendant’s trial
without making legitimate prosecution of child sexual abuse impossible.” Id. at 1384. The court
based this decision largely on its conclusion that the improper interviews were based largely on
over-zealousness and ineptitude rather than bad faith. Id.
227. Id. at 1383.
228. Id. While this may seem counter-intuitive, an attack on the techniques is not a direct
attack on the credibility of the child. Children are generally no less credible than adults; it is only
after suggestive techniques are used on kids that their testimony becomes suspect. Therefore, the
taint hearings are merely to judge the suggestiveness of the interview. See supra pp. 513-20.
229. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383.
230. Id. at 1383–84.
231. Id. at 1384. Again, the experts are not allowed to testify to the jury directly about the
credibility of a child witness.
232. See, e.g., People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
233. Jablonski, supra note 29, at 58.
234. See supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text.
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these hearings should be conducted. More specifically, this paper addresses
the issue of who should adjudicate the taint hearing.
V. TAINT HEARINGS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED BY AN ADJUDICATOR TRAINED
IN PSYCHOLOGY
Whether or not an interview has been conducted in an unduly suggestive
manner is a complex issue that takes into consideration a myriad of
psychological issues that are beyond the ken of most people.235 If an interview
is found to be suggestive, it will not be admitted into evidence, and quite
possibly the testimony of the child interviewed will be excluded at trial as
well.236 However, if an interview is found to be non-suggestive, it will be
admitted at trial and the testimony of the child will be a virtually
insurmountable item of evidence for a defendant, as well it should be for cases
in which abuse has occurred.237 Thus, the decision of whether an interview
was suggestive is quite an exceptional circumstance. A pretrial taint hearing,
therefore, is a “critical moment”238 in the litigation, wherein a judge must make
an informed decision about whether the lynchpin of a child sexual abuse
prosecution will be admitted.239 The judge must often decide between the
testimony of two competing experts, chosen by each side for his or her
particular stance on the suggestiveness of the interview involved.240 A judge
deciding such an issue should have some training in the social sciences,
statistics, and experimental methods and ideally some training in the
interviewing of child witnesses. Most judges simply do not have this
training.241 When a defendant has made a showing of “some evidence”242 of
improper interviews and a trial judge orders a taint hearing, the judge should

235. See supra pp. 513-20.
236. See Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1382–83.
237. Id. at 1382 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967)). Although a case
where the child’s testimony is excluded may still be successful because physical evidence may
still be used to convict the defendant, a child’s testimony that is admitted may be impossible for
the defendant to overcome. This is a burden that a defendant should not have to overcome if the
interview was suggestive.
238. Id. (citing Wade, 388 U.S at 230).
239. If the child’s testimony and the transcript from the child’s interview are both excluded
from evidence it is usually the death knell for a case, whereas getting the evidence admitted could
be equally destructive to a defendant’s case.
240. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383; Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that often an
expert is selected based solely for his beliefs and that this can be dangerous for child sexual abuse
cases); Andrew MacGregor Smith, Note, Using Impartial Experts in Valuations: A ForumSpecific Approach, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1247 (1994).
241. See supra note 41.
242. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383.
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also appoint a technically trained adjudicator,243 trained in the abovementioned sciences, to conduct the hearing. Before 2004, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure referred to such adjudicators as “special masters,” and this
paper will do the same.244
When a case involves technical, scientific issues, the appointment of
special masters has been forthcoming.245 Special masters have been appointed
for environmental issues,246 taxation issues,247 accounting issues,248 and many
other issues.249 The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA)
provides a good framework for the special master proposed herein: It provides
for the mandatory appointment of a special master for complicated vaccine
injury cases and provides for deferential review of the special master’s
findings.250 The case of Terran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services251
presents a great example of the use of a special master. In Terran, a young
girl, Julie Terran (Julie), began having seizures shortly after her third
diphtheria-pertusis-tetanus (DPT) vaccination.252 Causation issues developed
because Julie was also mentally retarded and shortly after birth had surgery to
remove a meningocele lump from her skull.253 When suit was filed against the
pediatrician who administered the DPT vaccination, the case was referred to a
special master pursuant to the NCVIA.254
243. “Special master” is the language used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 for such
adjudicators. FED. R. CIV. P. 53. The suggestion for a specially trained judge stems from this
rule, which refers to a person technically trained to sit as judge for specific issues. FED. R. CIV.
P. 53.
244. Id.
245. Goins v. Hitchcock I.S.D, 191 F. Supp.2d 860, 866–67 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (discrimination
issue); Heatley v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 6:01CV-1044-ORL22DAB, 2002 WL
31934322, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2002) (taxation issue).
246. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1042 (2d Cir. 1983);
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 98 F.R.D. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). In re “Agent Orange”
Product Liability Litigation is a particularly good example of a court’s reliance on special masters
to help with litigation. The court used at least eight different special masters for various parts of
the trial from discovery to appeal. Edward V. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A
Proposal for Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 486 (1993).
247. Heatley, 2002 WL 31934322, at *6.
248. Goins, 191 F. Supp.2d at 866–67.
249. Di Lello, supra note 246, at 486; see also D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, What are
“Exceptional Conditions” Justifying Reference Under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 1 A.L.R.
FED. 922 (1969).
250. 42 U.S.C. §1396 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §300aa–12(e)(2)(B) (2000); see generally Elizabeth
A. Breen, Note, A One Shot Deal: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 309 (1999).
251. 195 F.3d 1302, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
252. Id. at 1306.
253. Id.
254. 42 U.S.C. §1396 (2000); Terran, 195 F.3d at 1307.
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The special master in Terran addressed complicated factual issues and
conducted a “Daubert hearing”255 on the plaintiff’s proposed scientific theory
of causation.256 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., provides a
framework of factors for deciding when expert testimony or scientific evidence
should be admitted at trial.257 The court in Terran found that the special
master had appropriately used the Daubert test to decide the admissibility of
the plaintiff’s theory of recovery.258 “The special master found that the
Daubert inquiry raised serious questions about the testimony, and thus
concluded that the proffered theory of causation was not sufficiently
reliable.”259 Further, the special master made factual findings regarding the
temporal order of the vaccine and Julie’s other medical conditions and rejected
the plaintiff’s arguments that Julie exhibited a “unique seizure disorder.”260
Taking all these factors into consideration, the special master denied
recovery.261 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit then
held that without a finding that the special master’s findings of law and fact
were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,” it was compelled to affirm the special master’s
findings.262
A procedure similar to the one outlined by the NCVIA and utilized in
Terran would help ensure the fair adjudication of child sexual abuse cases,
when the suggestiveness of the child’s interview is in question. Section A
consists of a look at the sources of legal authority for courts to appoint special
masters. Section B concludes that the appointment of a special master to
adjudicate a pretrial taint hearing will not run afoul of any constitutional
provisions. Section C provides that the appointment of a special master to
adjudicate a taint hearing will not cause undue delay or expense. Courtappointed experts are examined and analyzed as an inferior solution to the
appointment of a special master in Section D. Finally, a procedure for the
appointment of a special master to adjudicate taint hearings is proposed in
Section E.

255. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
256. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1316.
257. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95. The factors include: (1) whether a theory or technique can
be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;
(3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards for
controlling the error; and, (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a
relevant scientific community. Id.
258. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1316.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1317.
261. Id.
262. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §300aa-12(e)(2)(B) (1994)).
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Courts Possess Ample Legal Authority to Appoint Special Masters

Judges can turn to at least four sources for the legal authority to appoint a
technically trained adjudicator to help decide issues.263 First, the authority to
appoint highly-trained individuals already exists in the rules of civil procedure
for most jurisdictions, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.264
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 allows judges to appoint a special master
by the consent of the parties, if a difficult accounting or computation of
damages is necessary, if a matter will be particularly time-consuming, or for
“some exceptional condition.”265 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 was
amended, effective December 1, 2003; however, it retains the “exceptional
condition” language.266 Special masters, under the amended rule, have
authority to decide factual issues and make special reports to the presiding trial
judge.267 While the amended rule altered the standard of review, requiring trial
courts to review the special master’s findings de novo,268 it remains to be seen
what deference the court will give such findings, in light of the more
deferential standard of review originally applied. Special masters have been
appointed to many types of issues pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
53.269 Most, if not all state jurisdictions have a counterpart to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53, allowing judges to appoint special masters for similar
situations.270 Clearly then, courts realize that there are often matters that are
simply beyond the scope of judges.
Courts also have the power to appoint a special master if the parties
consent to such an appointment.271 Most commentators and courts agree that
appointment of a special master under this power is subject to less formal
constraints than under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53.272 The third source

263. Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43
EMORY L.J. 927, 943–44 (1994).
264. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.490 (West 2004).
265. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (2004).
266. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(B)(i) (2003) (amended 2003), with FED. R. CIV. P.
53(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004).
267. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (2004); Di Lello, supra note 246, at 486–87; 28 FEDERAL
PROCEDURE, LAWYER’S EDITION § 64:57 ( 2004).
268. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(4). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, as originally written,
provided for a special master’s decisions to be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. FED.
R. CIV. P. 53 advisory committee’s note.
269. Di Lello, supra note 246, at 486; 28 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER’S EDITION § 64:57;
see generally Ytreberg, supra note 249.
270. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.490 (West 2004).
271. Farrell, supra note 263, at 943.
272. Id. at 943 n.54. Obviously, such appointments cannot contravene legislation or public
policy concerns.
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of power to appoint a special master is from specific legislative acts.273 For
example, the Magistrates Act provides that magistrate judges may be appointed
as special masters,274 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows for appointment
of a special master if the case cannot be set for trial within 120 days.275 The
appointment of special masters is even mandatory under some federal statutes,
such as the NCVIA.276 For matters involving injuries to children believed to
be caused by vaccines, a special master, with medical knowledge, is to be
appointed to determine whether there is a substantive claim of causation of the
injury against the vaccine manufacturer.277 Finally, courts have the “inherent
power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the
performance of their duties. . . .” including the “authority to appoint persons
unconnected with the court . . . . with or without the consent of the parties,” to
simplify and clarify issues and to make tentative findings.278
Special masters are often lawyers, possessing special knowledge in the
field; however, they need not be members of the bar.279 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53 does not require that the special master be a member of the
bar,280 nor do the state rules which allow the appointment of a special
master.281 Special masters are held to the same standards of professional
conduct a judge would be; however, anyone can be appointed to be a special
master if the court deems it appropriate.282 A special master appointed for a
taint hearing should follow this custom. While it would be nice to appoint a
special master who is trained in the law, the most important factor for fairly
deciding the issues of admissibility in a taint hearing is psychology training.
The special master should first and foremost be trained in psychology, then, if
possible, trained in the law. Obviously, some legal training should be afforded
such adjudicators so that the hearing can comport with the law. A legal degree
is not necessary, though. Appointment of a special master who is not legally
trained is not uncommon, nor is legal training necessary because of the limited
273. Id. at 943.
274. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (2000).
275. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (2000).
276. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c) (2000); Breen, supra note 250, at 318.
277. Breen, supra note 250, at 317–18.
278. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312–13 (1920).
279. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2003) (amended 2003) with FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2004); see
also JEAN M. NAFFKY, 45 FLA. JUR. 2D References § 6 (2004).
280. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2003) (amended 2003) with FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2004).
281. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.490 (West 2004); see also NAFFKY, supra note 279, at § 6.
282. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2003) (amended 2003), with FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2004); see
also NAFFKY, supra note 279, at § 6. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, a special master
is required to follow the same rules of conduct that a judge is required to follow, including
remaining neutral, not having a relationship with a party, and not maintaining any ex parte
contact with a party, among other requirements. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b)(2) (2004).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

532

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:499

evidentiary focus of the pretrial taint hearing and because the more stringent
rules of the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in these pretrial
situations.283
Appointment of a special master in child-interview circumstances would
be appropriate to address the problem of competing experts chosen solely for
their favorable stance to one side or the other.284 A special master with
training in this area would be able to make better sense of the evidence and be
less persuaded by a “hired gun” expert.285 With this in mind, the next issue is
whether or not the appointment of a special master in a criminal, pretrial taint
hearing, would run afoul of the Constitution.
B.

Appointment of Special Masters to Adjudicate Taint Hearings Does Not
Violate the Constitution

Special masters are appointed to “remedy a decisionmaker’s insufficient
technical background.”286 The fact that the proceeding is criminal, rather than
civil, does not make an adjudicator’s lack of technical expertise irrelevant. In
fact, because the structure of the criminal trial is such that it reflects a concern
for protecting the rights of the criminal defendant, a well-trained adjudicator is
even more necessary in criminal proceedings.287 A taint hearing is a
preliminary hearing on issues of admissibility of evidence at trial: A matter
within the province of judges, as provided in Federal Rule of Evidence
104(a).288 Particularly for admissibility matters, such as the testimony of a
child, which would greatly influence a juror’s decision regardless of the
suggestiveness of the interview, a judge should decide the matter of
admissibility.289 Because it would be virtually impossible for a jury to

283. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that for such pretrial evidentiary hearings the rules of
evidence do not apply). Thus, the special master need not be specifically trained in the many
rules of evidence in order to correctly conduct such a hearing.
284. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19; Smith, supra note 240, at 1247.
285. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19; Smith, supra note 240, at 1247.
286. Developments in the Law—Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1583, 1593 (1995).
287. William P. Haney, III, Scientific Evidence in the Age of Daubert: A Proposal for a Dual
Standard of Admissibility in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1391, 1431 (1994); see
also supra pp. 510-13 (discussing the use of special masters in criminal proceedings).
288. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court,
subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
Id.
289. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE 235 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the role of the judge in
admissibility decisions).
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disregard the testimony of a child, even if they found that the techniques were
too suggestive, the judge should decide such issues of admissibility and screen
out suggestive interviews.
Judges have wide latitude in the admissibility of evidence,290 and it is well
established that such questions of law are within the purview of judges,291 so
one cannot argue that such an appointment of a special master would run afoul
of a defendant’s right to a trial by jury.292 A preliminary evidentiary hearing,
conducted by a judge, is required by justice for admissibility questions
concerning such issues as hypnotically induced testimony293 and pretrial
identifications.294 It is also required when a child may have been interviewed
suggestively.295
The power to appoint special masters is limited by Article III of the United
States Constitution, which provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court.”296 The Constitution prevents
the “reference of a fundamental issue of liability to an adjudicator who does
not possess the attributes [of an] Article III [judge].”297 A taint hearing does
not decide the ultimate issue of liability, only admissibility of evidence;
therefore, a delegation of power to a special master does not violate Article
III.298 In fact, to allow an adjudicator not trained in technical matters to decide
such technical issues could arguably violate substantive fairness concerns.299
Furthermore, Article III judges retain the power to select and appoint such
special masters; thus, the judge continues to retain ultimate control over the

290. Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal
Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 758 (1993).
291. Id. at 747. See also ALLEN, supra note 289, at 235–45; Merle Faye Hoffman, Comment,
The Murky Waters Get Murkier—Admissibility of Evidence of Extraneous Misconduct in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases, Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App 1991), 34 S. TEX. L.
REV. 181, 184–85 (1993) (discussing the factors a judge should weigh in determining the
admissibility of evidence).
292. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . .”). Additionally, this is certainly the type of evidence a criminal
defendant would want excluded from a jury if the interview was conducted suggestively.
293. Hickey, supra note 208, at 773–74; see also supra pp. 523-24.
294. See supra pp. 523-24.
295. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382 (N.J. 1994); see also supra pp. 519-24
(discussing pretrial taint hearings).
296. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
297. Stauble v. Warrob, Inc., 977 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing In re Kimberly v. Arm,
129 U.S. 512, 524 (1889)).
298. Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters: Administrative
Agencies for the Courts, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235, 296–97 (1997) [hereinafter Widener
Symposium].
299. Id. at 297.
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proceedings.300 Finally, as early as 1932 in Crowell v. Benson, the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged the power of judges, in some cases, to
appoint special masters to assist the court.301 While the Court noted such
special masters were usually advisory in nature, it also acknowledged that “it
has not been the practice to disturb their findings when they are properly based
upon evidence . . . and the parties have no right to demand that the court shall
redetermine the facts thus found.”302
Therefore, a deferential use of special masters in taint hearings does not
present any constitutional problems. The only argument against special
masters that remains is the possibility of undue cost and delay.
C. Special Masters Will Not Cause Undue Delay or Increase Costs
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 warns courts to consider the additional
expense and delay that may attend the appointment of a special master;
however, some argue that the appointment of a special master in virtually any
case actually decreases the cost and certainly decreases the time necessary to
complete a trial.303 Efficiency and cost-saving arguments are based on the
speed with which a knowledgeable special master would be able to absorb and
interpret the expert’s testimony.304 Thus, there would be a cost-saving benefit
from shorter trials and less billing time for experts and attorneys, as well as a
reduction in court costs and the many other expenses associated with a trial.305
Added delay and expense probably stems from the addition of the pretrial
taint hearing itself.306 Taint hearings are necessary to prevent a misapplication
of justice when an interview was conducted suggestively.307 The additional
delay and expense of a taint hearing cannot outweigh the egregiousness of
admitting such damning evidence, if the evidence is tainted. The last issue to
be addressed is why the appointment of a special master is preferential to the
use of a court-appointed expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.
D. Appointment of a Special Master is a Better Solution than Appointment of
a Court-Appointed Expert

300. Id. at 296.
301. 285 U.S. 22, 51–52 (1932).
302. Id. The Benson court was referring to equity and admiralty cases. Id. at 51. However,
this shows that deferential use of special masters is no new idea in American jurisprudence.
303. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(3); Di Lello, supra note 246, at 473 (arguing that such special
masters would “bring about better, faster, more efficient and less expensive adjudication of
factual issues involving technical evidence.”); Widener Symposium, supra note 298, at 296–97.
304. See Di Lello, supra note 246, at 473; Widener Symposium, supra note 298, at 296–97.
305. See Di Lello, supra note 246, at 473; Widener Symposium, supra note 298, at 296–97.
306. This is in contrast to simply admitting or excluding the evidence without the hearing.
307. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377–78 (N.J. 1994).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 706 provides that the court may appoint its own
experts.308 The Rule does not limit the parties’ abilities to call their own
experts; it merely provides the authority for judges to appoint an impartial
expert to assist the court.309 The expert can be used to educate the judge on
fundamental concepts, to assess the methods used by other experts, to find
facts in complex scientific cases, to limit massive discovery requests, or to
assess claims, as well as any other areas with which a technically untrained
judge might need assistance.310 Special masters and court-appointed experts
are often used for similar purposes and their roles often overlap;311 however,
for the purposes of taint hearings, the appointment of a special master is just a
better option.
A special master should be appointed to solve the problem of an untrained
adjudicator deciding difficult technical issues presented by two opposing
experts. Appointment of a court-appointed expert does not solve this problem;
it merely adds another chef to stir the soup of suggestibility. The ultimate
issue of an untrained judge deciding the admissibility of a child’s testimony is
not avoided. Despite the presence of the court-appointed expert, a judge could
still be led astray by a “hired gun” expert, chosen solely for his or her stance on
the issue.312 Appointing an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 to
educate the judge on fundamental concepts of the technical issues leads to at
least two more problems: undue delay and incomplete knowledge.
Appointment of a court-appointed expert will lead to undue delay during a
taint hearing because the expert will need to take the time to educate a judge on
the issues, while a special master could simply decide the issues based on the
technical knowledge already possessed by the special master. Also, education
of the judge necessarily will involve incomplete training and knowledge
because the expert can only teach some of his or her knowledge of psychology
and statistics to the judge.313 A special master, on the other hand, requires no
308. FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show
cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to
submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the
parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.
Id.
309. FED. R. EVID. 706(a); Samuel H. Jackson, Comment, Technical Advisors Deserve Equal
Billing with Court Appointed Experts in Novel and Complex Scientific Cases: Does the Federal
Judicial Center Agree?, 28 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 (1998).
310. FED. R. EVID. 706(a); Jackson, supra note 309, at 443–44.
311. Jackson, supra note 309, at 443–44.
312. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19; See Smith, supra note 240, at 1247.
313. Of course, it would be possible to have the court-appointed expert teach the court all of
his or her knowledge in the field of psychology and statistics; however, this would exponentially
increase the delay of the trial.
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additional technical training to understand the technical issues at play during a
taint hearing and would possess a more complete grasp of the issues than could
be taught to an untrained judge in a timely manner.
Finally, the appointment of a court-appointed expert would likely achieve
essentially the same results as the appointment of a special master, except with
a large increase in delay and a decrease in fairness. A judge is likely to view
the expert she appointed as a “super-neutral” “super-expert” and to value her
expert’s opinion over other experts’ opinions.314 So, first of all, it is likely the
court-appointed expert’s opinion would be the decision of the court, as would
be the special master’s opinion, except with the undue delay inherent in
training the judge in the technical matters. Additionally, a court-appointed
expert is not likely to be present during the parties’ experts’ testimony for
reasons of expense.315 Therefore, the court-appointed expert would lack the
opportunity to consider the theories of the other experts during their testimony.
The court-appointed expert would also not have a chance to question the other
experts. The special master would be given ample opportunity to witness the
testimony of the experts and to question the parties’ experts during the taint
hearing. This will lead to a more well-informed special master, which will
lead to fairer decisions about admissibility at taint hearings than could be
achieved through the use of court-appointed experts. Finally, the procedural
aspects of appointing a special master to a taint hearing should be addressed.
E.

Proposed Procedure for the Appointment of a Special Master

The appointment of a special master in pretrial taint hearings is necessary
to protect children and defendants alike.316 The master should be selected from
an impartial group, with knowledge of the psychological issues at play. Many
psychologists have recommended “monitoring groups” to watch over experts
used during the course of a trial,317 and such protections should be in place for
special masters as well. Attorneys with psychological training, particularly in
the field of interviewing, would make the most ideal candidates; however,
special masters need not be attorneys,318 and it would be inappropriate to so

314. Developments, supra note 286, at 1591.
315. The expert could be present to view all the testimony, but the cost of court-appointed
experts, borne by the courts, would likely rise quite quickly. FED. R. EVID. 706(b).
316. Both children and defendants will be protected because the special master will be able to
make a more well-informed decision whether to exclude. This would decrease the risk that nonsuggestive interviews would be excluded and that suggested interviews would be admitted.
317. Lamb & Sternberg, supra note 44, at 821. Such a group would review licensed
psychologists and researchers to be sure of professional conduct. See id. This would further help
reduce the chances of “hired gun” psychology. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 15, at 19.
318. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2003) (amended 2003), with FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2004); see
also NAFFKY, supra note 279, at § 6.
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limit the pool of possible special masters in this situation. Major cities could
select trained professionals from university researchers or practitioners.
Smaller jurisdictions will likely still have access to some choice of private
practitioners or practitioners associated with hospitals. However, if a
jurisdiction has no one to fill this position, it would be the duty of the court to
find an appropriate special master, most likely one selected from a pool of
candidates maintained in larger jurisdictions.
Persons chosen to be special masters should, as in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53, be duly compensated for their time and should be allowed to
refuse the position.319 The decision of a special master, appointed under these
circumstances, should be given great deference. Amended Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53 now provides for de novo review of the special master’s
findings,320 while the original allowed only for an abuse of discretion standard
of review.321 For taint hearings, the decision of a special master should be
afforded the deference provided under the NCVIA.322 The NCVIA provides
that findings of fact or conclusions of law of a special master should not be
overturned unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with [the] law.”323 The NCVIA provides a great
framework for the rule proposed by this Comment. It requires referral to a
special master for vaccine injury cases involving children and provides for
quite deferential review of the special master’s findings.324 Mandatory referral
to special masters for taint hearings and deference to the special master’s
findings are necessary for justice. The special master is chosen for his or her
knowledge of psychology and techniques of interviewing that are not within
the ken of most trial judges; therefore, the judge should take a deferential
stance to the special master’s findings. It should “not [be] the practice to
disturb their findings when they are properly based upon evidence . . . .”325
Finally, the costs of special masters should be born by the state, at least
upon a showing of an inability of the defendant to bear the cost. 326 At least
319. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(h); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 53 advisory committee’s note (stating that
an expert should be compensated).
320. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(3) (2004).
321. FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2003) (amended 2003); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 53 advisory
committee’s note.
322. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–12(a); see generally Breen, supra note 250.
323. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–12(e)(2)(B) (2000); Terran v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 195
F.3d 1302, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
324. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–12(a), (c)(6)(E) (2000).
325. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). Although it may turn out that the de novo
review allowed under Amended Rule 53 will be similarly deferential, for taint hearings, a
deferential standard should be explicitly set forward.
326. A state prosecution of a defendant should bear such a burden for indigent defendants to
assure that all are guaranteed a fair trial.
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one state has held that for criminal proceedings, the parties should not and,
indeed, cannot be forced to bear the costs of a special master.327 Such fees
were deemed part of the costs of court operations, which must be paid from the
public funds allocated to the court unless the legislature has specified
otherwise.328 This would be appropriate for taint hearings to ensure that the
cost of a properly trained adjudicator is not too great for defendants to bear.
These procedures may, of course, be experimented with in various
jurisdictions. The key now is to begin to put these procedures into place to
ensure the fair adjudication of charges of sexual abuse against children and to
protect the rights of children as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
The trend is that more and more jurisdictions will eventually follow
Michaels and conduct pretrial taint hearings when an allegation arises that an
alleged child sexual abuse victim has been interviewed suggestively and that
child’s testimony should be excluded from trial. These decisions weigh
immensely on the success of the prosecution of a sex offender. Therefore,
when a taint hearing is ordered, a special master should be appointed to
oversee the hearing. The special master should be trained in psychology,
statistics, experimental methods, and, ideally, in interviewing children. This
will allow for the most informed decision on whether or not an interview was
unduly suggestive, which will work to protect both children and defendants.
CLAYTON GILLETTE

327. People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Laff), 23 P.3d 563, 587 (Cal. 2001);
Dennis S. Newitt, Who Pays the Special Master’s Fees?, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 285, 287
(2002).
328. Superior Court, 23 P.3d at 587.
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